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The Joint Committee on Federal Social Security Amendments 
originally drafted California's extensive State Supplementary 
Program, under the leadership of our former State Assemblyman, 
now Congressman, John L. Burton. Because of the magnitude of 
California's investment in aiding its aged, blind and disabled 
--almost $500 million last year, more than $600 million this year 
--the Committee has continued to monitor the novel experience 
of federal administration of state monies. 
We are fortunate to have regular contact with both state 
and federal administrative agencies. At the same time we receive 
requests daily from individual constituents and state and federal 
legislators for help in resolving SSI problems. In this way, we 
are able to measure the impact of policies and agency claims of 
improved performance against the yardstick of recipient satis-
faction. 
It is clear to us that after a year and a half of operation, 
the SSI program still has far to go before legislators, adminis-
trators, and the public can be fully confident that the program 
is doing the job Congress intended. In making this conclusion, 
we recognize the tremendous effort Social Security Administration 
has made taking on the program and then attempting to cope with 
the almost overwhelming difficulties the program has faced. Nor 
do we disregard the encouraging signs that the worst is now 
behind us. 
But recent improvement still must be viewed in terms of what 
the Social Security Administration itself has set as its standards, 
and what the public has a right to expect. 
1. INADEQUATE STAFF AT SOCIAL SECURITY. Commissioner 
Cardwell of the Social Security Administration urges the need 
for additional staff to help pro~ess SSI cases. Original 
staffing estimates were based largely on the Title XVI program 
as it was originally proposed to Congress, and did not adequately 
take into account the many Congressional changes both before 
and after HR-1 finally passed. The assumption persisted that 
SSI cases would not take as long to process as a regular Social 
Security claim. We have been told that, based on these assump-
tions, Social Security requested 19,000 new employees to handle 
SSI nation-wide. The situation was worsened when Social Security's 
estimates of new staff needed to run SSI were woefully short of 
the mark. The situation was worsened when OMB made further re-
ductions in the new employee authorization. 
The program rapidly overwhelmed the staff. Overtime began 
a dizzying spiral upward. In the last three months of 1973, as 
District Offices prepared for SSI, overtime doubled over the 
previous quarter to almost 600,000 hours. In January, 1974 alone, 
the first month of SSI operations, more overtime was used than 
in the entire previous four months. Total overtime used by the 
Social Security Administration in the first year of SSI operations 
was more than 6,700,000 hours. This is 3 1/2 times as high as 
1973's overtime, and represents the amount of work it would take 
a single worker almost 38 centuries to perform. 
The effects of short staffing are still being felt. They 
#> 
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cannot be overemphasized. Inadequate staff means overworked 
employees who lack time for proper training, are inclined to 
make greater errors, are unable to adapt quickly to changes in 
policy or procedure, take longer to do the basic work, and are 
more inclined to seek other work elsewhere. As a result, the 
level of experience and proficiency of staff remains low. 
Inadequate staff does not add to other problems; it multi-
plies them. 
Our first recommendation, then, would be to do whatever is 
necessary to give Social Security Administration the basic 
human resources to operate the program smoothly and efficiently. 
2. POOR INFORMATION FLOW AND COORDINATION WITHIN SOCIAL 
SECURITY. SSI was engrafted onto an administrative structure 
which was not prepared to deal with means tests and programs 
based on need. Except for the Bureau of Supplemental Security 
Income (BSSI), the program operates through bureaus which have 
existed many years, and have their own ways of doing things. 
So, although BSSI is supposed to be the bureau which sets 
basic policy in the program, instructing staff what the policy is 
and how to implement it is the responsibility of the Bureau of 
Field Operations (BFO, formerly the Bureau of District Office 
Operations, BDOO). Thus, we have a tremendous duplication of 
efforts under which ~ bureau has its own manuals setting forth 
SSI policy--the SSI Handbook, published by BSSI, and the Claims 
Manual, published by BFO. Each is massive, each is updated almost 
daily as policy and/or procedures change. 
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The same is true in disability cases, which fall under the 
-
province of the Bureau of Disability Insurance (BDI). BDI is 
somewhat more comprehensive in its approach, establishing not 
only disability criteria, but actually monitoring performance 
of the evaluation process. BDI has its own publications dealing 
with the peculiarities of disability, yet these documents often 
repeat materials found in both the Handbook and the Claims Manual. 
It has always been the intention of Social Security to inte-
grate all of this material into the Claims Manual which will even-
tually become the single source of information. But for the past 
18 months, and presently, policy materials relating to SSI are 
issued by the three bureaus already mentioned, without any indica-
tion that any one of them is overseeing the flow of information 
to the District Offices. Additionally, specialized units work-
ing on particular problems may send out their own infrequent 
instructions to staff. The information blizzard is joined by 
occasional gusts from regional offices which send out their own 
materials to cover local peculiarities of policy or procedure. 
The result in the District Office is a daily avalanche of 
material from innumerable sources, in ever-changing formats, in 
which SSI policies may compete for attention with materials 
regarding regular Social Security and Medicare. Little wonder 
that it seems to take inadequate staff so long to implement 
changes in policy or improved procedures. 
This pattern persists with respect to statistical and 
management data needed to assess program performance and take 
corrective action. Each bureau keeps its own kinds of data 
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and does not often, or even frequently, share this inform-
ation with others. Numerous times the staff of our Committee 
has been told by one bureau that certain statistics are not 
kept and cannot be obtained, only to find that another bureau 
has exactly what we need. 
Overall, in fact, management data about SSI has been much 
less than adequate. For example, one indicator of how well 
cases are being handled is how long it takes to process a claim 
from application to actual payment. While a computer-generated 
report has been promised since the program began, so far as 
we know there is nothing currently available. The computer 
report has been issued, but sporadically. At one point it was 
decided to stop publishing it altogether. It was revived in 
March of this year, but the only report provided us since then 
had the processing times crossed out with "Do Not Use" hand-
written over that section. 
To some extent this is explainable as a result of inade-
quate staff pressed to do everything possible simply to get 
checks to eligible recipients. But without adequate management 
data, it is impossible to know exactly how to improve the system 
to get the best use of resources. 
A recent re-organization of Social Security places all of 
the bureaus involved in the SSI program under a single Office 
of Program Operations. Whether this will improve the communica-
tions between the bureaus or better co-ordinate the flow of 
information to the District Offices remains to be seen. It 
certainly represents a step in the right direction. 
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3. COMPUTER SYSTEMS LIMITATIONS. Commissioner Cardwell 
has stated that when the SSI program began, the computers were 
not fully able to handle the work. The computers were completely 
incapable of issuing checks to some kinds of cases. 
Since then, new computers have been added, programs have 
been refined, and new procedures have been developed to correct 
mistakes. But still, the computers are unable to issue checks 
to all eligible persons. 
In Region IX, for example, approximately 6-7,000 checks 
each month must be manually issued. This imposes burdens on all 
the parties concerned. The process to issue checks manually does 
not begin until the recipient complains to the Social Security 
Office. A manually-issued check will not arrive until two to 
three weeks later. 
In one case which came to our attention, the computer had 
never issued a check to a woman who should have been automatically 
converted from the state Aid to the Disabled program when SSI 
began. After 15 months, the woman still had to call her Social 
Security office to tell them her check hadn't arrived, then 
wait two to three weeks for a hand-issued check. Her check for 
March, 1975 did not finally arrive until almost the middle of 
April. Everyone seemed to agree the problem was a mistake in 
her Social Security number as it appeared in the SSI records. But 
no one seemed able to correct the problem, nor did anyone ever 
begin the manual procedure in time to assure her of getting a 
hand issued check on the first of each month. 
Since she did not receive a computer-generated check , she 
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did not receive a Medi-Cal card. California depends on Social 
Security -for the names of all SSI recipients. But Social 
Security is only able to provide the names of people who get 
computer-generated checks. 
Because the manual issuance process takes so long, the 
woman was given a temporary loan by her county welfare depart-
ment under a unique program California instituted to deal with 
the problem of non-delivered SSI checks. This required the 
woman to travel to the next county to the nearest Social Security 
office to obtain necessary verification of her eligibility, 
then back to her home county to the nearest county welfare 
office. She would then have to go to a second welfare office 
still further away to obtain a hand-issued Medicaid card. These 
burdens were greatly increased by the fact that the woman is 
disabled and has no automobile. 
We should mention that after we discussed this case in a 
public hearing in April, the Regional Commissioner of Social 
Security personally intervened, and recently told me that the 
woman's problems have been solved. 
While this case is an extreme example, it does highlight 
what happens when the computer system cannot cope with a case. 
And, there are still major situations the computer is unable to 
handle. One persistent example is the married couple who both 
became eligible for SSI, but on different dates. Say the husband 
becomes an SSI recipient, and 8 months later, his wife turns 
65 and also becomes eligible. At that point, the computer, which 
has been paying the husband dutifully, suddenly stops paying 
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either of them. 
Another major problem with couples is what happens when 
one member dies. The computer is unable to adjust the grant 
to pay the survivor the amount to which an individual is entitled. 
Special procedures have been developed for some of these 
situations. None of them seems to anticipate the problem, only 
to compensate for systems limitations when the problem arises. 
Usually the computer is "forced" to issue a check which its 
program says should not be issued, or pay a grant amount which 
the program says is improper. 
But the basic problem persists that the computer systems 
are not able to cope with many common situations or everyday 
occurrences, with the result that checks are not properly adjusted 
to reflect current circumstances, or, worse, suddenly stop 
altogether. 
4. LONG DELAYS IN PROCESSING. The most frequent~complaint 
we hear from recipients is that Social Security seems to take so 
long to process SSI cases. The problem involves not only initial 
applications, but changes in the recipient's situation. For 
example, many recipients have told our staff that they fear that 
if they move, their SSI checks will stop since it seems to take 
up to 6 months for Social Security to process a change of address. 
It is at the initial application point, though, that recip-
ients have the greatest concern. This is because the person 
who qualifies for SSI has insufficient income to meet his or her 
needs. Every day of delay means another day of essential 
expenses that cannot be met. 
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Commissioner Cardwell has stated that the median time 
for processing aged SSI claims is now 38 days, and for dis-
ability cases it is 77 days. This does not mean that eligible 
individuals received payments within these times. Remember 
that because of human errors and computer limitations, many 
individuals who have been found eligible do not receive their 
payments. 
Further, the figures Commissioner Cardwell used are medians. 
This means that only half the cases were processed in these 
periods~ half took longer. In fact, some cases took more than 
a year to process. 
Before going further,we must remind you that data has never 
been available to us to show how long it takes from initial 
application to actual payment. However, some data has been 
provided us. It indicates that Social Security should be far 
from pleased with its present performance. 
Case processing is broken into several steps. First, 
there is the evaluation of income and resources in the District 
Office. Then, if the case involves a disability, it is evaluated 
in a separate disability determination unit operated by the 
state under contract with Social Security. If the case is 
eligible for SSI, it should be entered into the computer, and no 
further action is necessary. However, should the computer not 
be able to issue the check, the case may be sent to Data Pro-
cessing for further work. 
In analyzing these processes, we are relying on Social 
Security's "SSI-MARS Management Analysis and Review System," 
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the most recent issue of which covers February, 1975. 
One measure of how well cases are being processed is the 
number of cases which have been in the District Offices more 
than 20 days. Social Security has set a national goal to have 
only 25% of the disability workload in the District Office more 
than 20 days old. Yet, as of the end of February, 1975, 41.5% 
of the disability cases had been in the District Office more 
than 20 days. 
In aged cases, the performance measured against Social 
Security's own standards was worse. The goal is to have only 
10% of the aged cases pending more than 20 days. As of the end 
of February, however, 40.4% of the aged cases were older than 
20 days, more than four times as many as Social Security would 
desire. 
At the state agencies where disability evaluations are 
performed, the goal is to have only 7.5% of the caseload pending 
more than 45 days. Actual performance at the end of February 
indicated the goal was far from being met, with 20 . 4% of cases 
having been at the state agency more than 45 days. 
At Data Processing, which attempts to do whatever is 
necessary to get the computer to pay problem cases, no process-
ing goals have been set. Two measurements are used, however, 
the number of cases pending more than 30 days, and the number 
which have been pending more than 90 days. At the end of 
February, there were more than 202,000 cases at BDP. 59.2% 
of them had been there more than 30 days, and almost half of 




In Region IX, the Bureau of Disability Insurance regularly 
samples SSI cases to track processing times. ('tile might mention 
this as another example of poor inter-bureau coordination of 
effort and communication, since no~e of the other bureaus seems 
to be able to provide the same information for their processes, 
nor, as far as we know,do they make use of the BDI data. In 
fact, when our staff asked for similar data nationally, we were 
told that the central office does not make a similar compilation.) 
In February, 1975, in Region IX, median processing time 
was 70 days, slightly better than the national median. Remember, 
though, that half the cases took longer than 70 days. How much 
longer is graphically shown by the firgure that 34% of the cases 
had taken more than three months, and took up to 372 days--a 
year and a week--to process. This meant that at least one case 
processed in February, 1975 was an individual who had first 
applied for SSI in January, 1974. (In January, 1975, at least 
one case was completed which had been opened 406 days earlier--
some time in November or December, 1973.) 
Interestingly, although the disability evaluation program 
operated by the state is frequently blamed for the long delays 
in processing disability cases, the Social Security District 
Offices have had cases pending there longer than any at the 
state agency. Some cases languished in the District Offices as 
long as 330 days, while none was at the state agency more than 
286 days. 
These processing time statistics are dramatically under-
scored by the requirements the Secretary of HEW imposed on the 
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states in processing these very ~~ses in ~heir state welfare 
programs. Under the Secretary's regulations, except in unusual 
situations, the states were required to process claims for aid 
to the aged within 30 days of application, and disability cases 
in 60 days. 
Measured against any standards, Social Security Administration 
still is not responding adequately to the concerns of Congress 
or the needs of recipients in processing its caseloads. 
5. POOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS. It is unfortunate 
but true that the various federal and state governmental agencies 
involved in SSI administration have less than perfect relation-
ships. 
More pervasive, however, is the inadequate co-ordination 
between the two levels of government. The result is the creation 
of large administrative gaps through which recipients too often 
fall. Representatives of our state's welfare agency will tell 
about the tremendous problems which exist trying to have Social 
Security offices refer SSI recipients to state service and aid 
programs for which the recipients qualify. 
We have already mentioned the problem California has trying 
to issue Medical cards automatically to all SSI recipients. 
Because Social Security's data exchange does not include recip-
ients who are not paid automatically by the computer, as many as 
10,000 recipients a month are not issued Medi-Cal cards to which 
they are entitled. They must obtain confirmation of their ssr 
eligibility, then obtain a Medi-Cal card which the county must 
issue by hand. 
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The disabled and elderly cannot easily tolerate the 
inconvenience of this burdensome procedure especially when 
it must be done month after month. (The state, by the way, 
has its own burdens, to the tune of more than $1 million spent 
hand issuing Medi-Cal cards to SSI recipients who were not 
included on Social Security's data tapes.) 
Another extremely annoying example is the notice about 
Medicaid sent to all persons in states where Social Security 
administers the state supplement. The notice tells the unfort-
unate recipient that "An agency of your State will get in touch 
with you about the Medicaid program in your state. You don't 
need to do anything more about Medicaid until you hear from 
them" 
This is completely misleading. In the first place, Social 
Security has never instructed the states to seek out SSI 
ineligibles and enroll them in Medicaid. Worse, the states have 
no way to find these people, since Social Security only sends 
the states lists of eligible individuals, and does not provide 
the names of persons denied SSI or terminated from the program. 
As a result, thousands of elderly, blind, and disabled individuals 
each month are wrongly advised not to apply for medical assist-
ance for which they may be eligible, and which they may desperately 
need. 
State officials in California pressed Social Security to 
change this deceptive practice. We do not know if other states 
have made similar attempts. But, in California, the process of 
trying to tell recipients the truth has involved negotiations 
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between the state and federal governments which have gone o n 
for almost a year. First, Social Security had to be convi nced 
that it had a responsibility not t o mis l ead recipien ts , and t o 
tell them directly that they should contact the stat e t o obtain 
medical assistance. Then the state had to decide what language 
·social Security should use in making the referral. So far as 
we are aware at the Joint Committee, the negotiations are still 
incomplete, and Social Security continues to deceive thousands 
of recipients each month. 
6. HARSH AND COMPLEX POLICIES. Commissioner Cardwell 
continues to stress the complexity of the SSI program. The 
Secretary's regulations do little to ease the problem. As an 
example, we encourage you to read the regulations dealing with 
individuals living in someone e l se's h ousehold. Congress has 
required that grants to these indivi duals be reduced 1/3 to 
account for the value of room a nd board contributed to them by 
the head of the household. As an exerci se in f utility, we 
e n courage you to read the regu lations wh i ch are supposed to tell 
you who gets reduced 1/3 and who doesn ' t. You will find them 
in the Claims Manual at Section 12310, and the SSI Handbook a t 
Section 6065. 
To see how unusually restrictive the administrative inter-
pretation of Congressional policy can be, we can t hink of no 
better example than the rules regarding income "deemed " to be 
available to an SSI recipien t from a spouse or parent wi t h 
whom the recipient lives. In Section 1614(f) of the Socia l 
Security Act, Congress directed the Secretary to es t abli s h 
policies regarding deeming, leaving to administrati ve di s cret ion 
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the question of how much of a spouse or parent's income 
should be deemed available to the SSI recipient. Without 
questioning the Congressional decision to deem income avail-
~e to a recipient in this situation, there are serious problems 
in the manner the Secretar y has adopted to implement the policy. 
For example, consider a husband and wife living together. 
The husband does not meet any categorical qualification for SSI, 
and has income from a private pension. The wife is sufficiently 
disabled to receive SSI, but some of the husband's income is 
deemed available to her . In computing the amount deemed avail-
able to the wife, the Secretary has decided that the husband 
shall live on $73 a month. All the rest of his income is deemed 
to be his wife's. 
The regulations do not explain how it was decided the 
husband should have a standard of living only half as much as 
an SSI recipient is paid. In states which supplement the federal 
payment, the husband's living standard is even less in comparison 
to the amounts paid SSI recipients. In California, $73 a month 
is less than 1/3 of what a single SSI recipient is paid. 
But the real point is that, by allowing the husband only 
$73 a month for his living costs, most of his income is deemed 
available to his wife, who may thus be ineligible for SSI. In 
states which supplement the SSI grant, the couple may be forced 
to live on less than the comparable grant standard . In California, 
eligible couples currently receive $440 a month. This is the 
minimum California considers an adult married coupl e requires 
to meet their ne~ds. Yet , in our example, if the ineligible 
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husband has a private pension of only $328 a month , his 
disabled wife cannot receive SSI. Both are forced to live on 
a monthly amount more than 25% below the grant standard. Many 
people working in agencies which directly serve the elderly 
have expressed their belief that this policy encourages elderly 
couples to separate. 
In the case of eligible disabled or blind children, income 
is "deemed" available from parents. A person over 18, however, 
is considered an adult, and no income is deemed available even 
though the individual lives with his or her parents. A disabled 
person of age 19 can receive SSI while living at home regardless 
of the parents' income. (Although the grant may be reduced l/3 
in this situation because the individual is living in the 
household of another.) 
However, Congress has defined "child" to include students 
between 18 and 21 years old. The Secretary's regulations interpret 
this to penalize individuals in this age group while they attend 
school, by classifying them as "children", and deeming income 
to them from their parents . 
A dismaying example of the result has occurred several times 
in San Francisco. Federal , state and private agencies have educ-
ational programs to help the trainable mentally retarded acquire 
sufficient skills to become self-supporting. The programs are 
often designed particularly to serve the retarded between ages 
18 and 21. However, as soon as the individual enrolls in this 
program, the Secretary classifies him or her as a "child", and 
deems income available from the parents. The result in many 
cases is termination of the grant. 
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In §h9~t, the P-Olicy encourages those who might be trained 
to be self-sufficient to remain idle, while at the same time 
discouraging them from obtaining education benefits designed 
to help them become, at least partly, if not totally, self-
supporting. 
Altogether, the regulations governing SSI can be complex , 
harsh, and self-defeating. 
7. EMERGENCY AID PROGRAMS INADEQUATE TO THE NEED. Three 
programs exist to help SSI recipients in dire financial emerg-
encies. 
First, a person eligible for SSI may receive a $100 advance 
on the first SSI check. Although not even half the SSI payment 
amount in California, this short-term solution has helped many 
of the constituents who have contacted the Joint Committee about 
problems getting checks once they have been found eligible. 
But it is small help in the face of administrative delays 
that can mean many months before the first SSI check is finally 
issued by the computer , if it is issued at all. 
A second program will allow a disabled applicant to receive 
assistance for up to 90 days if the individual is "presumptively " 
eligible for SSI. Frankly, we have never understood why Congress 
denied this same benefit to the elderly and the blind. But 
until very recently, the Secretary's regulations made it unavail-
able to all but a very few of the disabled. Until three months 
ago, to be presumptively eligible an applicant had to have (1) 
a leg amputated at the hip, (2) any two limbs amputated, or (3) 
total deafness. The regulations were recently modifi ed to 
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!nc!ud~ the __ !flore comp~lling c~ses of terminal cancer, or 
total hospital confinement after a serious accident. 
But the great probl em here is t h e fact that the benefits 
are only available for 3 months. With hal f the disability 
cases taking more than 77 days, and more than a third still 
unresolved after 3 months, and some taking more than a year, 
the 90 day limitation is clearly insufficient. Congress should 
strongly consider amending the Act to allow presumptive elig-
ibility payment s through the time that a final decision as to 
eligibility for SSI has been made. 
The third program to he l p individuals in financial emerg-
encies is the replacement of lost or stolen checks. There are 
two problems here. First, the program only helps people 
whose checks have actually been issued by the computer. It is 
not available to that large group to whom the computer is un-
able to issue checks at all because of systems limitations. 
These individuals must wait through long delays while their 
checks are manually processed. This is what happened to the 
woman referred to earlier whose checks never arrived for 
fefteen consecutive months . The process to issue a check 
manually, by the way, is grossly misnamed the "One Time Payment" 
procedure, even though in many cases "One Time Payments" are 
made several more times than once . 
The second problem with the lost or stolen check replace-
ment program is that, while faster than manually issuing checks, 
it s t ill takes 7-10 days. These are days in which the recipient 
is unable to pay rent, or buy food. A delay of a few days is 
critical in the life of the needy at the economic margin of 
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subsistence. 
I strongly endorse Congressional and Legislative efforts 
to vest Social Security with whatever authority is needed to 
provide checks to all eligible persons whose grants do not 
arrive on time within 24 hours of the recipient's notice to 
Social Security. 
B. COST OF LIVING ESCALATORS ON RESOURCE LIMITATIONS. 
Congress wisely provided that the purchasing power of SSI 
grants would not be eroded by inflation, and built into the Act 
an automatic cost-of-living provision. 
At the same time, nothing was done to recognize that the 
purchasing power of the income and recources of recipients--the 
11 means 11 , which are the subject of the means test--is reduced by 
a rising cost of living. A cash reserve of $1,500 today will 
purchase much less than the same money would have bought 18 
months ago. On the other hand, to purchase what $1,500 would 
provide in January, 1974 an individual today has to spend over 
$1700. 
On the other hand, some resources, particularly real property, 
tend to increase in value over time. This is in large degree 
simply another aspect of inflation, since to purchase the same 
piece of property requires an ever greater number of dollars whose 
purchasing power is diminishing. 
By not allowing resource limitations to increase at the same 
rate as the cost of living, Congress restricts the SSI program to 
people who have assets whose real ability to provide an alter-
native means of support is steadily diminishing. 
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Thus people who have assets of fixed value, such as cash, 
which are over the resource limits, may be ineligible today, 
even though their assets would not support them at the same 
level $1,500 would have provided yesterday. Individual s with 
assets whose value increases over time, such as real property, 
may be eligible for SSI today, and ineligible tomorrow. This 
is exactly what can happen to some property-owning recipients 
in San Francisco this year when the city reappraises the value 
of their homes. 
An obvious and simple answer is to provide in the statute 
for the same cost of living escalator on resource limits that 
is given in the grant itself. 
9. FISCAL RESTRICTIONS ON STATE SUPPLEMENTATION. Finally , 
we come to one of the most troubling concerns of the California 
l egislature. To illustrate the problem, consider the grant in 
California to a single aged individual, presently $259 a month. 
Of this, the federal government pays $151, or approximately 
60% . The state pays the remaining $108,or around 40% . Yet, 
at the end of last calendar year, of total expenditures on cash 
grants to the elderly, blind and disabled, California had spent 
almost 60%, while the federal government spent just over 40%. 
The primary reason this occurred is that income of recipinets 
goes first to offset the federal contribution. Not until an 
individual has $151 in chargeable income is the state able to 
reduce its contribution to the grant. On the other hand, a person 
with more than $151 chargeable income receives a grant paid 
entirel y by the state, and nothing from the federal government. 
This is true in each of t h e 32 states which provide mandatory or 
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optional supplements above the SS I g r ant . 
---- - - - --- -- -
To put the matter in perspective, the si t uation can be 
viewed i n light of the fo rmer progr ams where stat e a n d federal 
governments s h ared equal l y in the grant , and in a ny offsetting 
recipient income . Had this experience continued under SSI, 
Cal ifornia's adult aid expenditures in calendar 19 74 woul d have 
been approximately $80 million less than we actually spent. 
This would be about what the state would have to pay under the 
former sharing formula in order to provide its SSI recipients 
true cost of living adjustments in their grants. 
Under the present system, however, every dollar above the 
SSI level must be paid by the state. So, if California were to 
increase SSI grants to account for cost of living changes over 
the past 18 mont hs , the state would have to bear the entire cost , 
presentl y estimated a t about $170 million. The Legislature is 
now trying t o cope with t h e problem of assuring the purchasing 
power of the grant is not eaten away by inflation , and tryin g 
to pay for it. 
The federal "ho l d har mless .. provision does not offer any 
rea l help to the state . The Congressional formula protects the 
state up to the leve l of adult aid grants in 1 972 . But California 
had l aw going back 13 years which raised its adult grants every 
year to account for cost o f l i v ing increases. Many other states 
had similar provisions. The hold harmless provi sion which is 
b a sed on 1972 grant level s off e r s t h e stat e n o h e l p in trying to 
hold grants at t he l eve l s paid i n 1 973 . 
Nor does the hold harmless provision offer any assistance to 
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the state which wishes to increase its present level of state 
supplementation to account for rising living costs. 
Various proposals have been made to build into the hold 
harmless formula protection for cost-of-living increases in 
state supplementation. It is this Committee's understanding 
that Congress is currently considering several different pro-
posals which would insure that a cost-of-living increase is 
received by all SSI beneficiaries. 
The State of California has a keen interest in assuring 
California's elderly, blind and disabled, that inflation will 
not rob them of the ability to purchase the basic necessities 
of life. With Congressional help, we can assure the citizens 
of California and all other states that they will be able to 
continue to afford the cost of simply staying alive. 
SUMMARY. In short, the SSI program has yet to fulfill the 
promise of HR-1. Understaffing, poor administrative operations, 
and computer limitations seriously hamper the ability to process 
cases quickly and accurately. Poor inter-governmental working 
relationships create huge gaps into which many recipients fall, 
failing to receive adequate help from either federal or state 
agencies. Inadequate programs to aid those in financial crisis, 
and harsh, unduly complex regulations make it unnecessarily 
difficult for the elderly, blind, or disabled in need to receive 
assistance. Fiscal restrictions impose tremendous financial 
burdens on states which supplement SSI, and may cause grants to 
be eaten away by inflation. 
It is clear that more , much more, needs to be done legis-
latively and administratively. Strong, direct, immediate action 
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is needed to unsnarl the massive foul-ups which still hinder 
the effectiveness of SSI. 
We do have one particular suggestion in this regard we wish 
to give special emphasis. 
As Commissioner Cardwell noted, one of the greatest factors 
contributing to the problems of SSI has been the administrative 
process within Social Security Administration. While the Agency 
staff are conscientiously trying to do their best, the structure 
and procedures of the Social Security Administration often seem 
to stand in the way of the best intentions. Commissioner 
Cardwell has acknowledged many of these difficulties, and has 
stated that a task force organized and supervised by the Agency 
is now working on the problem. 
We respectfully urge that this is not enough. 
The Administrative problems which create so much misery for 
SSI recipients are shared by Social Security recipients as well. 
These problems are different in the SSI case only because the 
recipient lacks adequate, if any, alternative means of support. 
Many, if not most, of these problems predate the SSI. We're sure 
that each of you has direct knowledge of the massive difficulties 
your constituents faced trying to obtain Social Security benefits, 
long before there was an SSI program. 
We are greatly concerned, therefore, that any "in-house" 
appraisal of needed administrative reforms will be too vulnerable 
to the myopia to which all of us are prone after years of doing 
a job in a set way using the only tools we have available. It 
may never occur to us that a single, different tool can help us 
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do the work faster and better. Or, if the idea does occur, it 
is too often rejected simply because it is different or because 
we just don't know how to change. 
We suggest, then, that a first priority for Congress should 
be to authorize a private, highly reputable management analysis 
consulting group to make a full-scale, in-depth study of the 
structure and procedures of the entire Social Security Administ-
ration, with particular emphasis on the SSI program. This review 
should then be reported back to Congress to enable you to eval-
uate the recommendations, monitor their implementation, and make 
any needed legislative changes. 
We cannot stress too much the need to take all steps to 
assure that the administrative mechanism is in the best of con-
dition. Any legislative program must always depend on an effi-
cient, smoothly functioning administrative agency to be effect-
ively implemented. Simply put, you need good tools to do a 
good job. 
The investment in such an intensive, thorough appraisal 
could bring immeasurable returns in helping the SSI program 
fulfill the goals set by Congress, better aid to the needy, and 
create confidence that the program is adequately and conscient-
iously serving the public. It can help assure that we can soon 
add SSI to the long list of proud accomplishments in government 
efforts to serve the needs of the citizens. 
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